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ABSTRACT
Features of Part D gave rise to broad concern that the drug benefit would negatively impact prescription
utilization among the six million dual eligible beneficiaries, either during the transition from state
Medicaid to Part D coverage, or in the long-run. At the same time, Part D contained other features,
such as its auto-enrollment and premium subsidization policies, which were designed to safeguard
utilization for this vulnerable group. Using national retail pharmacy claims, we examine the experience
of dual eligibles during the first 18 months of Part D.  We find no evidence that Part D adversely affected
pharmaceutical utilization or out-of-pocket expenditures in the transition period, or in the 18 months
subsequent to Part D implementation.
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The Part D drug benefit represents the single largest change to 
Medicare in its 40 year history. Due to the size of the program—
the program enrolls over 25 million seniors and is expected to 
cost over $700B in its first 10 years of implementation—
considerable attention has been paid to studying the effect of 
the part D benefit on aggregate drug utilization among seniors, 
seniors’ out-of-pocket expenditures, total federal expenditures 
and revenues of drug manufacturers (1).   
There are, however, important reasons to examine the effect of 
the Part D drug benefit on specific subpopulations, especially 
the more six million beneficiaries who were dually eligible for 
Medicare and Medicaid (dual eligibles). With Part D 
implementation, dual eligible beneficiaries faced new rules 
governing their access to pharmaceuticals and were no longer 
subject to the same protections found under Medicaid law (2). 
Further, while dual eligibles pay no premium and face no 
deductible under Part D, they may face slightly higher co-
payments for covered drugs, or full out-of-pocket cost of drugs 
not included in their Part D plan formulary. Potential adverse 
effects of instances of higher cost sharing are compounded by the 
relatively low income and asset levels among dual beneficiaries, 
and by random auto-enrollment of the vast majority of duals 
beneficiaries into Part D plans whose formularies may not include 
drugs demanded by specific individuals (3). In addition, dual eligible beneficiaries have a higher incidence 
of disabling and chronic illness and lower incomes and education 
than the average Medicare population (4), making these 
beneficiaries more vulnerable to coverage lapses due to the 
administrative complexity associated with transitioning from 
Medicaid to Part D.  
Early data on dual eligibles’ access to prescription drugs 
provided cause for concern. For example, in a telephone survey of 
employed dual–eligibles in Kansas conducted in early 2006, 20% of 
participants reported difficulties obtaining medications, 13% 
were required to switch medications, and 8% stopped taking at 
least 1 medication (5). In another study of a nationally random 
sample survey of psychiatrists regarding their experiences with 
prescription drug access among dual eligibles, more than one half 
(53%) of physician respondents had at least one patient with a 
medication access problem and more than one fifth (23%) of 
physicians reported having discontinued or temporarily stopped a 
patients’ medication because of prescription drug coverage or 
management issues (6). Some of these problems may have been due 
to system level difficulties (such as identifying the low-income 
status of patients) in transition where the dual eligibles were 
incorrectly charged, improperly asked to pay deductibles, or not 
listed in plans they thought they were enrolled in.  
These new rules and other challenges to implementing Part D were 
widely anticipated and there was considerable apprehension regarding the potential for disrupted access to prescription 
drugs for the dual eligibles (7). In response, varying state 
contingency plans were developed to help transition dual 
eligibles into PDPs.  For example, during early 2006, 37 states 
implemented temporary coverage programs to provide low-income 
Medicare beneficiaries access to drugs through Medicaid (6). 
Additionally, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), required all Part D plans to have “transition plans,” for 
example, to offer a one-time supply of drugs not included in the 
formulary but which were previously consumed by new enrollees 
(8). These programs may have played an important role in 
mitigating any short-run difficulties faced by dual-eligibles 
during their transition between Medicaid and Part D coverage.   
To date, no empirical analyses have been performed to look at the 
effect of Part D on the burden faced by dual eligibles in terms 
of drug usage, out-of-pocket costs and total drug expenditures 
(9). We attempt to fill this gap by using pharmacy claims from a 
national pharmacy chain accounting for approximately 15% of the 
outpatient prescription drug market in the United States.  
Therefore, this study offers an opportunity to study the impact 
of Part D on this vulnerable population based on a broad national 
sample of Medicare beneficiaries. 
 METHODS 
Data 
We selected a 5% random sample of unique pharmacy customers who 
filled at least one prescription both in the 2005 and the 2006 
calendar years at any retail or mail order member of a national 
pharmacy chain.  For each of these subjects, we obtained claims 
data for every prescription filled between January 1, 2005 and 
April 31, 2007.  We formed two groups – a ‘treatment’ group 
comprising of dual-eligibles who were between 65- 78 year old on 
January 1, 2005; and a ’control’ group comprising near-elderly 
patients with Medicaid coverage between 60-63 year as of January 
1, 2005(17). Importantly, these near-elderly control subjects 
were not eligible for Medicare. For identification of Medicaid 
subjects, we looked for the use at least one prescription that 
was reimbursed by Medicaid during the entire pre-Part D period of 
January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005. Subjects identified as 
covered by Medicaid and ages 65-78 as of January 1, 2005, 
constituted our sample of dual eligibles.  Due to the infrequent 
churning of the dual eligibles in and out of Medicaid (10), we 
relied on a single Medicaid prescription to identify dual-
eligibles (11). Subjects in the control group were identified by 
their having filled at least one prescription reimbursed by 
Medicaid during both the pre- and post-Part D periods. In order 
to ensure that we do not include non-elderly dual eligible 
patients in the control group, we excluded patients in this age range if any of their prescriptions were reimbursed by Medicare 
during the entire study period (12).  
For each prescription claim, we obtained data including subjects' 
demographic characteristics (age, sex, language preference, zip 
code of residence), insurance characteristics (prescription drug 
plan, method of payment), pharmacy characteristics (zip code 
location), prescription characteristics (National Drug Code 
[NDC], therapeutic class, drug dose, number of treatment days, 
date dispensed, number of refills), and expenditures (amount paid 
out-of-pocket, amount paid by third party).  We used data on 
subjects’ zip code of residence (i.e. the residence recorded at 
subjects' first pharmacy claim in 2005) to link the pharmacy 
claims data to data from the 2000 Census, including information 
on the total population, median household income, income per 
capita, fraction urban, fraction African American, unemployment 
rate, and poverty rate within the zip code of residence. 
 
Statistical analyses 
We began with a simple exploration of how our data matched up to 
national estimates on total number of prescriptions used, total 
out-of-pocket payments and total prescription expenditures (13).  
We then studied the effect of Medicare Part D on four 
pharmaceutical outcomes using regression discontinuity designs: 
(1) total number of prescriptions per month, (2) pill-day – a prescription utilization measure similar to medication possession 
ratio that counts the number of days with a pill summed across 
all prescriptions, (3) monthly out-of-pocket costs, and (4) total 
prescription expenditures (14). We excluded subjects age 80 and 
over, since the proportion of subjects in nursing homes is higher 
among subjects in this group and since changes in the Medicare 
Modernization Act regarding nursing and long-term care subjects 
do not extend to the majority of the Medicare population (15). 
To estimate the impact of Part D, we estimate the break in trend 
at the start of 2006 for each of the outcome variables among the 
dually eligible sample. To interpret this trend break as the 
impact of Part D, we control for secular trends in the outcome 
variable unrelated to Part D. The most straightforward way to do 
this is to estimate a difference-in-differences multivariate 
regression: we estimate the break in trend among our Medicare 
dual eligible subject sample (while controlling for 
characteristics of each subject); we then adjust this impact by 
the break in trend estimated among the near-elderly control 
sample. The adjusted trend break provides an estimate of the 
impact of Part D on dual eligible beneficiaries, having net out 
secular trends in the outcome variable. Estimating trend breaks 
is done using multivariate Generalized Estimating Equations 
(GEE), which is commonly preferred over linear least squares when 
estimating highly skewed medical expenditure and utilization 
outcomes (cite?)(18). In our fully specified model, we estimate the impact of Part D 
during both the enrollment period and “stable” period after the 
May 31, 2006, enrollment deadline; and allow for both the 
intercept (break in trend) and the slope of outcome variable 
trend lines to differ. Details about the specifications of these 
models are given in the Appendix.  
Note that for the near-elderly to be a good control for dual 
eligible subjects, secular trends in their prescription drug 
expenditures and utilization must be similar. We test whether 
trends in outcomes among the 60-63 year old sample was similar to 
our dual eligible sample group during the pre-Part D period 
(January 2005 to December 2005).  To do so, test whether the 
slope of the trend lines during the pre-Part D period differ 
significantly. We expect there to be a difference in mean level 
of each outcome variable between the two groups; however, the 
difference in the outcome variables need to be constant over the 
pre-Part D period in order for the near-elderly to suffice as a 
good control.  
Next, we examine medication adherence and discontinuation as some 
of the heterogeneity in medication switches maybe masked in the 
total utilization measures that we studied above. Using 
multinomial regressions we estimated the probability of 
continuing, discontinuing or initiating a medication with a 
specific NDC-code between the pre-Part D period and the stable 
Part D period (19). We studied the differential rate of continuation between dual–eligibles and the control group. We 
compared this profile in continuation probabilities between dual 
eligibles and control group.  
Finally, we use the same difference-in-difference strategy 
discussed earlier to examine changes in the overall percentage of 
generic prescription use between pre Part–D and stable post-Part 
D period and contrasted them between the dual-eligibles and 
control group patients with at least one prescription in the 
stable post period. 
Standard errors for all parameters were obtained via 1000 
bootstrap replicates clustered by subjects, and a variety of 
model fit criteria was used to check the goodness of fit for our 
models (20). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 describes basic characteristics of our dual eligible (n = 
10,837) and control cohorts (n = 3,199).  Dual eligibles were 
older and fewer preferred English as their primary language, but 
were otherwise comparable to the control group of patients. 
Despite being younger, our control group had greater average 
annual drug utilization and expenditures, which may reflect both 
the severity of health conditions for elderly Medicaid patients 
about to enter Medicare as well as the most death of the most severely ill patient before reaching older ages (mortality 
effects).  Unadjusted changes between pre and post Part D periods 
were not significant for any of the drug utilization measures for 
either the control or the dual-eligible group. 
 
Trends in expenditures and utilization 
Figure 1a shows the trends in average monthly out-of-pocket 
expenditures for dual eligibles and the control group of near-
elderly subjects ages 60-63.  Expenditures for the two groups 
tracked each other closely in the pre-Part D period, suggesting 
that the near-elderly suffices as a comparison group. Trends in 
expenditures continue to track each other closely in the post 
Part D period (21). Immediately following the implementation of 
Part D, expenditures for both groups continue to decrease during 
the transition period and then leveled off.   
 
Figure 1b compares the trend in actual observed expenditures to 
the trend in predicted expenditures assuming Part D was never 
implemented (this is a “counterfactual” trend calculated using 
parameter estimates from the GEE regression analysis) (16). There 
were no significant changes in trends in the dual-eligibles’ out-
of-pocket expenditures due to Part-D. Similar results were found 
for total monthly expenditures (Figures 1(c) and 1(d)); pill-days 
(Figures 2(a) and 2(b)); and total number of prescriptions 
(Figures 2(c) and 2(d)). The formal results are summarized in Table 2. Although slightly higher levels of changes were found 
for each of the outcomes in the transition period than the stable 
period, these changes were neither meaningfully large in 
magnitude or nor statistically different from zero. 
 
Probability of starting, stopping, or continuing medication 
Next, we studied the probability of continuing, discontinuing or 
initiating a new medication between pre Part D and the stable 
phase of post Part-D.  We find that among all medications for 
which at least one prescription was filled in either of the two 
periods, dual eligibles filled a prescription for 17.5% of the 
medications in both the pre and post periods (continuation), 
filled a prescription in the pre period but not in the post 
period for 42.5% of the medications (discontinuation), and filled 
a prescription in the post period but not in the pre periods for 
40% of the medication (initiation) (Table 3). These proportions 
were almost identical for the control group patients implying 
that Part D did not meaningfully impact patterns of prescription 
usage among dual eligibles.     
Focusing on only those medications that were used in the pre-Part 
D period, we found that the probability of filling a prescription 
for the same medication following Part D increased with the 
number of prescriptions filled in the pre period among both 
beneficiaries and control subjects. This supports the fact that 
patients who use a medication in a chronic manner are more likely to continue to use it over time. However, as before, we did not 
find any difference in the probability of continuation between 
dual eligibles and the control group at any level of pre-period 
usage (Figure 3). 
Finally we studied the proportion of generic prescriptions used 
between the pre- and the post-Part D period.  We find that 
compared to the pre-period, dual eligibles were 4.8% more likely 
to use generic prescriptions in the post–period (Table 3). 
However, we see a similar change in the control group and 
suggested that this change was not due to Part D. 
DISCUSSION 
In this analysis of a diverse sample of dual eligibles accounting 
for a substantial portion of the overall U.S. market of 
prescription drugs, we found that Part D did not adversely impact 
either prescription utilization or expenditures among 
beneficiaries dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.  In 
addition, our results suggest that other aspects of dual 
eligibles’ prescription utilization, such as the initiation of 
new therapies and the rates of generic drug utilization, also 
were not adversely impacted by Part D. 
 
Despite designing Part D benefits for dual eligibles to protect 
this vulnerable population against the lack of continuity of 
necessary drugs, several concerns regarding its implementation 
and its promise of seamless access to drugs were raised at the time of transition.  Our findings of no adverse impact of Part D 
on dual eligibles both in the short-run and the in the long–run 
post part-D implementation are important to mitigate these 
concerns and also to highlight the joint role of federal and 
state policy-makers who devoted substantial efforts to ensuring 
that the transition to Part D would not lead to unintended 
consequences among this group. Perhaps, the most important of 
these efforts were the rapid steps taken by several state 
governments in allocating additional funds to cover drugs for 
dual eligibles during the first three months of Part D 
implementation, during which pharmacies, patients and providers 
figured out the nuances of the disintegrated system of PDPs and 
the varying formularies that accompanied them. 
 
One interesting implication of our study results is that since 
the total reimbursed amount for prescriptions and also the total 
number of prescriptions and pill-days were not found to be 
affected by Part-D, it may indirectly imply that prices may not 
have been affected due to this transition. This is in line with 
the Congressional Budget Office’s anticipation of the price 
effects of Part D (23). 
 
Although our data are not nationally representative and may not 
characterize the experience of all dual eligibles, the data offer 
an important opportunity to examine the impact of this marked 
change in prescription coverage for millions of Americans.  Furthermore, in prior analyses, our subjects were found to be 
similar to a nationally representative sample, and estimates of 
the overall impact of Part D on prescription utilization were 
highly consistent with those predicted by economic theory (23). 
However, the experiences for the dual eligible patients that we 
find in our study may also be attributed to resources allocated 
by this pharmacy chain which may not be representative of the 
national experiences of all dual eligibles. 
 
One limitation of our study is that we assume that the absence of 
a prescription claim for an individual subject represents zero 
utilization for that subject, rather than missing data.  However, 
individuals may obtain their prescriptions from more than one 
pharmacy chain, and thus it is possible that subjects observed 
here obtained only part of their medicines from this chain alone.  
Although loyalty to one pharmacy chain would not threaten our 
conclusions (due to our use of a similarly defined control 
group), any correlation between loyalty and Part D enrollment 
would influence findings drawn from this serial cross-sectional 
analysis.   However, our analysis of a sub-sample of subjects for 
whom we have complete prescription benefits manager (PBM) data 
suggested that similar large proportions of subjects of each age 
group (>90%) filled all of their prescriptions within the 
pharmacy chain in both 2005 and 2006, and we applied inclusion 
criteria requiring subjects to have at least one prescription 
claim during both 2005 and 2006.   Conclusions 
Part D represents a policy change of enormous proportions.  Any 
undertaking as complex as this is bound to face challenges, and 
particularly during the transition period during the first few 
months of the benefit there was considerable concern about the 
impact of the transition on dual eligibles.  Many of these 
challenges were anticipated, and efforts by numerous stakeholders 
were made to address those that weren’t anticipated.  Our report 
suggests that dual eligible patients’ prescription utilization 
and expenditures have neither increased nor decreased due to Part 
D.   
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(d) Figure 2: Observed and predicted time trends in outcomes for dual eligibles and the control group. 
The corresponding factual and counterfacturl tends post Part D for the dual eligibles are also 
presented. 
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Figure 3: The average probability of continuing a medication (NDC-code-specific), filled in the 
pre-part D era, in the post part D stable period. TABLE 1.  DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECTS FILLING PRESCRIPTIONS WITHIN NATIONAL PHARMACY CHAIN.  
  CONTROL 
Subjects on Medicaid 60-
63 years old 
(n=3,199) 
TREATMENT 
Dual Eligibles 66-79 
years old 
(n=10,837) 
Age, years (SD)  61.8 (1.1)   72.2 (3.7)  
Female sex, percent  67.3   69.4  
English language preference, percent 
(SD) 
92.1   82.3  
Characteristics of zip-code based on 
2000 Census  
   Total population, thousands (SD) 
   Median household income, thousands 
(SD) 
   Income per capita, thousands (SD) 
   Fraction urban population, percent 
   Fraction African-American, percent  
   Unemployment rate, percent  
   Poverty rate, percent  
 
 
29.6 (16.9) 
19.2 (6.6) 
7.9 (3.0) 
91.8 
22.2 
92.1 
16.7 
   
 
32.1 (17.5) 
20.8 (8.2) 
8.5 (3.9) 
94.3 
19.2 
92.4 
15.9 
 
  Pre-Part D Post-Part D Pre-Part D Post-Part D
Total monthly prescription drug 
utilization, pill-days (SD) 
103 (128) 106 (132) 96 (115) 99 (121)
Total monthly number of prescriptions 
(SD) 
3.6 (4.4) 3.6 (4.4) 3.1 (3.6) 3.1 (3.7)
Total monthly out-of-pocket prescription 
expenditures, $US (SD) 
13.8 
(65.8) 
14.1 (66.1) 14.9 
(65.4) 
14.7 (65.1)
Total monthly prescription expenditures, 
$US (SD) 
222 (367) 227 (390) 178 (275) 183 (304)
The sample of 177,311 subjects includes 59,663 unique control group subjects (ages 60-63), and 117,648 
treatment group subjects (ages 66-79), observed in both 2005 and 2006. Standard deviations (SD) are 
reported in parentheses. Table 2: Impact of Part D on out-of-pocket prescription expenditures and prescription utilization.  
Impact reported as average monthly expenditures or utilization and reported separately for period 
prior to Part D enrollment deadline (“Transition period”) and period following Part D enrollment 
deadline (“Stable period”). 
 
  Average adjusted monthly 
outcomes for beneficiaries 
ages 66-79 
  Differences due 
to Part D 
  Actual 
outcomes 
Predicted 
outcomes 
without Part 
D 
  Absolute 
change 
Percent change
“Transition period”           
  OOP Rx Costs ($)  16.5 (0.48)
+ 17.8 (1.33)
+   -1.25 (1.19) -7.0 (6.7)
  Total Rx Costs ($)  186.1 (2.7)
+ 180.7 (5.4)
+   5.49 (4.9) 3.0 (2.7)
  Pill-days  100.7 (0.91)
+ 99.1 (1.59)
+   1.60 (1.24) 1.6 (1.2)
  Total # of Rx  3.21 (0.03) 3.18 (0.05)   0.03 (0.04) 0.9 (1.25)
          
“Stable period”           
  OOP Rx Costs ($)  14.2 (0.49)
+ 14.7 (2.12)
+   -0.50 (2.19) -3.2 (14.9)
  Total Rx Costs ($)  181.2 (2.9)
+ 181.6 (7.2)
+   -0.43 (7.2) -0.2 (3.9)
  Pill-days  98.0 (0.91)
+ 96.3 (2.02)
+   1.61 (1.66) 1.7 (1.7)
  Total # of Rx  3.07 (0.03)
+ 3.03 (0.06)
+   0.04 (0.06) 1.3 (2.0)
 
Counterfactual average monthly outcomes calculated as from predicted values of the GEE models; overall 
effects reported in the third column are calculated as differences between actual and counterfactual 
outcomes; overall outcomes as a percentage of the predicted outcomes without Part D reported in the fourth 
column; + p<0.05; standard errors obtained via 500 bootstrapped replicates. 
 Table 3. Adjusted probabilities for discontinuing, continuing and initiating new medications in 
post Part D stable period compared to per Part D period in the dual eligibles and the control 
group. 
 
  Dual-Eligibles Control   Difference 
Probability of          
   Discontinuing  42.5 43.6   -1.1 
   Continuing  17.5 18.1   -0.6 
   Initiating  40.0 38.3   1.7 
        
 %-point change in        
  generics Rx use
*  4.8 4.6   0.2 
        
+ p<0.05; standard errors obtained via 500 bootstrapped replicates. 
* Among patients with at least 1 Rx in the Stable Post-Part D period 
Appendix 
Denoting Y to represent a specific outcome, we model 
Log(E{Y| X, M, Pre, TR, STB, Trt}) =  
 
β0   + β1*M*Pre + β2*M
2*Pre + β3*M
3*Pre +      
 
(Pre Part D Trends for Control) 
 
β4*Trt  + β5*M*Pre*Trt + β6*M
2*Pre*Trt  + β7*M
3*Pre*Trt + 
 
    (Pre Part D Changes in Trends for Treatment)  
 
β8*TR     +  β9*M*TR  +        
  
(Transition Period post Part D Trends for 
Control)    
 
β10*TR*Trt  + β11*M*RU*Trt +  
 
  (Ramp-up post Part D Changes in Trends for 
Treatment) 
 
β12*STB   + β13*M*STB + β14*M
2*STB + β15*M
3*STB +  
 
(Stable post Part D Trends for Control)       
 
β16*STB*Trt + β17*M*STB*Trt + β18*M
2*STB*Trt  + β19*M
3*STB*Trt 
+ γ
T*X 
 
  (Stable post Part D Changes in Trends for 
Treatment)    
where, 
M = (Months – 15) and Months range from 1 to 32, 
Pre = Indicator for Time < Jan 06 
TR = Indicator for Time > Jan 06 and ≤ May 06 
STB = Indicator for Time > May 06 
Trt = Indicator for Treatment Group 
X = additional covariates that include… 
 
Step 1: Examine estimates of β4, β5 and β6. They represent the 
changes in the cubic trend between the treatment and control group 
during the pre-Part D period. Perform joint test to see if 
statistically significant. Even if significant (which may be a 
manifestation of sample size), examine the values to infer whether 
the trends are substantively different between the treatment and control groups. If they are not different, then we proceed to form 
counterfactual using the control trends in the post Part D period. 
 
Step 2: Predict factual and counterfactual trends: 
2.a. Predict Factual trend for the Ramp-up post Part D period: 
ˆ E {Y| XTrt, MRU} = exp( 0 ˆ β  +  4 ˆ β  +  8 ˆ β  +   9 ˆ β *M +  10 ˆ β  +  11 ˆ β *M  +  ˆ γ
T*X), 
where only M in the Ramp-up post Part D period and X’s for the 
treatment group are used.  
2.b. Predict Counterfactual trend for the Ramp-up post Part D 
period: 
ˆ E {Y| XTrt, MRU} = exp( 0 ˆ β  +  4 ˆ β  +  8 ˆ β  +   9 ˆ β *M  +  ˆ γ
T*X), 
where only M in the Ramp-up post Part D period and X’s for the 
treatment group are used.  
2.c. Difference between these factual and counterfactual 
estimates averaged over the M in the  Ramp-up post Part D period 
and X’s in the treatment group provides as estimate of the policy 
effect for the Ramp-up post Part D period. 
 
2.d. Predict Factual trend for the Stable post Part D period: 
ˆ E {Y| XTrt, MSTB} = exp( 0 ˆ β  +  4 ˆ β  +  12 ˆ β  +   13 ˆ β *M +  14 ˆ β *M
2 +  15 ˆ β *M
3 +  16 ˆ β  
+  17 ˆ β *M +  18 ˆ β *M
2  +  19 ˆ β *M
3 +  ˆ γ
T*X), 
where only M in the Stable post Part D period and X’s for the 
treatment group are used.  
2.e. Predict Counterfactual trend for the Stable post Part D 
period: 
ˆ E {Y | XTrt, MSTB} = exp( 0 ˆ β  +  4 ˆ β  +  12 ˆ β  +   13 ˆ β *M +  14 ˆ β *M
2 +  15 ˆ β *M
3 + 
ˆ γ
T*X), where only M in the Stable post Part D period and X’s for the 
treatment group are used.  
2.f. Difference between these factual and counterfactual 
estimates averaged over the M in the Stable post Part D period 
and X’s in the treatment group provides as estimate of the policy 
effect for the Stable post Part D period. 